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Abstract
Privatization and company law have been the most important instruments of
transforming Russian enterprises. State enterprises have been privatized and modern
company law governs how they function, but privatized companies have not changed
their business culture. Privatization did not divide management and ownership and did
not create efficient stock markets to monitor managers. Managers were able to keep
their authoritarian methods inherited from socialist management and rent-seeking in the
absence of control.
Protection of minority shareholders does not function in practice, since managers can
easily circumvent the rules. They can also ignore the rules of company law, which are
not widely known and differ from earlier practices.
There are already too many forms of companies in Russia. Only two forms of
companies are mostly used; namely the joint stock company (open and closed) and the
limited liability company. Difficulties already emerge with registration. Local
authorities may apply their own rules. Corporate governance is not yet a big issue in
Russian company law studies, which concentrate on the rules of forming and dissolving
juristic persons.
Bodies of companies are in principle modern. The board of directors is already powerful
on the basis of the law for joint stock companies, but in practice it is even more
powerful. The governance of limited liability companies has been arranged in a flexible
way to make the running of a company as easy as possible for small enterprises.
Russian company law also recognizes personal liability of managers or shareholders in
some exceptional cases. Such rules have been adopted from European company laws
and it remains to be seen how they are used in Russian circumstances.
Russian enterprises still have a lot of social responsibilities to bear. The situation is
quite different from Western company law, where stakeholder theory is being
introduced. In Russia too heavy social responsibilities are an obstacle for restructuring
and transforming into a profitable modern company. Environmental questions are
widely ignored both because of old attitudes and new aspirations of profit and
maintaining jobs.
Russian enterprises are experiencing the same learning process, which Western
companies have encountered over centuries. The most difficult problem in transplanting
modern company law is that law is not respected. Law is ignored because there is a
huge gap between formal rules and business culture. The hopes that are vested on courts
to effect a change of business culture are exaggerated. Everywhere courts have only
limited possibilities to effect issues, which are mainly decided within private
governance. The courts alone are not able to change the business culture.
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1Russian Enterprises and Company Law in Transition
Soili Nysten-Haarala
1 Introduction
1.1 A Firm in Company Law and in Institutional Economics
Law defines a company as an organization regulated by certain legal rules. These rules
are some kind of preconditions, which are set for the companies to be able to define
them and then operate with legal methods. From the point of view of company law,
companies differ from each other according to different company law regulations.
However, legal regulations do not make a company. Each company has its own
corporate culture within the framework of legal regulations. Thus, setting new
regulations does not necessarily make companies function in a new way. Law is not
only a simple and practical technical tool; it is much more. Law is an institution, which
is connected with other institutions of society. Institutions are the rules of the game, of
which law constitutes a significant part of the formal rules (North, 1992). The
significance of law in each society is dependent on its connection with informal
institutions. Law counts more in some societies than in others. Legal scholars
representing legal realism express the same idea claiming that law is not only a system
of norms. It becomes law only when it is implemented and when people feel that law
binds them (Ross, 1966).
Legal studies, however, usually focus only on formal legal rules omitting other
institutions and the interaction between them. Specializing on legal regulation protects
the autonomy of law and separates law from other social studies (see, e.g., Hart, 1978;
Kelsen, 1968). It can be claimed that law is to a large extent endogenous. Legal studies
have built a system of concepts and their own methodology in studying legal rules.
Such studies are needed in interpreting law in courts. Endogenous law, however,
protects its boundaries and has difficulties in responding to the needs of a changing
society. Law in itself is a good example of institutions, which resist change and tries to
stick to its own stable rules and ways of thinking. Changes have to be transferred into
this “legal language”, before they have any chance of being accepted in the circle of
lawyers, who guard the endogenous legal system. However, even if law is endogenous,
it has to interact with the surrounding society and at least to some extent respond to its
needs. Otherwise law will become insignificant and overruled by informal rules.
Company law is needed to define certain rules for business organizations, such as
norms protecting minority groups in a company or third parties such as creditors or
others whom companies may damage. In this respect the state also has important
2political aims and power to regulate business activities. The legislator can decide what
principles should be followed in implementing company law. According to Tolonen
(1974) the traditional ideological model, which understands that the company fulfills
the will of the shareholders, is being displaced by a more dynamic theory. In this new
approach the company is seen as a rational actor aiming at economic efficiency and
other practical objectives, which should guide legal interpretation.
Tolonen’s idea suggests that the aims of a company should be found outside the legal
system of norms. Legal studies cannot answer the question: “What is a company?”
Therefore economic and business studies have always affected the legislator. After
Berle and Means (1967) established the concept of managerialism in the early 1930s in
the United States, the focus of the legislator has been on regulating the relations
between shareholders and managers. In economics, the institutional approach took a
long step towards a new dynamic theory on the firm. It really tries to answer the
question “what is a firm and what are its aims?”, while neo-classical economy focuses
on markets and different variables, which may affect how they function. Coase’s (1937)
article on The Nature of the Firm, gradually started to draw attention to a firm. Coase
saw that a firm is a way of organizing activities and that the organization is chosen
among different possibilities in order to reduce transaction costs. A firm is actually a
nexus of contracts,1 the organizing of which vary between contracting in a market
without any organization and a hierarchy, which draws the contracts within the
organization. The nexus of contracts idea moves the focus from the relations between
shareholders and managers to a broader understanding of a firm.
Coase’s focus on a firm and transaction costs has created a wide range of studies.
Transaction costs are not the only factor in choosing the organizing forms. Williamson
(1985) has paid attention to governance structures. He found a lot of aspects that affect
governance structures. There are behavioral aspects such as the assumption that human
beings are “intendedly rational, but only limitedly so” (Simon, 1961). Therefore all
forms of complex contracting are unavoidably incomplete. Another behavioral
assumption is that human beings are given to opportunism. Their self-interest seeking
leads them to opportunistic behavior if promises are not supported by credible
commitments. These two assumptions suggest that economic activity has to be
organized so as to economize on bounded rationality and simultaneously safeguarding
the transactions in question against the hazards of opportunism (Williamson, 1988:68).
Williamson also identifies critical dimensions with respect to which transactions differ.
The principal dimensions for the purposes of describing transactions are:
• the frequency with which their appear,
• the degree and type of uncertainty to which they are subject, and
• the conditions of asset specificity.
Contracting parties commit themselves in a credible way if they have specific assets.
They can use the specific asset to tie their partner in business cooperation in a credible
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 The nexus of contracts idea was later developed in the 1970s by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama
(1976) as well as Alchian and Demsetz (1972). It took several decades before Coase’s articles started to
interest other economists.
3way. For instance, a contracting party may have special technological knowledge, a
special site or specialized production capacity for a specific customer.2 Asset specificity
does not exist in occasional market contracts, but is connected with relations of mutual
dependence.
Williamson also combines a process analysis to studies of organizations. It applies
North’s ideas of institutional change to a microlevel (cf. North, 1992; North and
Thomas, 1973). Processes should be studied in connection with specific contracts. A
process outcome is often an unanticipated consequence and also unwanted. For
example, demands for control cause both greater control and make those, who are
subject to control, adapt.  The focus on process introduces a richer model of
organization, which takes unanticipated adaptations into account. A “machine model”
of organization cannot explain unwanted results.
1.2 Transition and a Firm
Economic and institutional theories have been developed in a market economy
environment. This development can be described as a long process of learning
(Tolonen, 1974). In market economies, types of firms have developed in practice.
Company law has then responded to the needs to control and monitor, to sanction
human opportunism. The most significant feature of a capitalist firm is that ownership
and control are separated (Berle and Means, 1967). The managerial revolution occurred
quite early in the United States and turned the focus of company law on corporate
governance. The significance of the role of professional managers was identified and
thus emphasized. Since the interests of managers differ from those of the owners,
responsibility to shareholders also became an important issue of company law.
Corporate governance has also later extended responsibility to other stakeholders.
The development of a firm has been totally different in socialist economies. In Russia
the learning process of a market economy was disrupted by the October Revolution of
1917. In a planned economy enterprises were governed in an administrative manner.
The whole economy worked like a huge hierarchy. Agency problems were great,
because it was quite difficult for the state owner to control and monitor such a huge
hierarchy. Managers found unwanted means to effectuate their own interests. They had
to arrange production in such a way that it pretended to fulfill the plan, but under this
umbrella managers treated the enterprises as their own. Privatization did lead to a
managerial revolution, but this revolution did not separate ownership and control. On
the contrary, managers became the main owners in most privatized companies.
However, they did not turn into such entrepreneurs who created capitalism in the
western world, but continued to survive in an economy that is neither a market
economy nor a planned economy.  Modern company law was then transplanted into this
environment.
The Russian economy turned into that, which Gaddy and Ickes (1998) started to call a
virtual economy. Socialist pretense has survived in a virtual economy, where signals of
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 Williamson (1996:105) distinguishes six types of asset specificity, namely, site specificity, physical
asset specificity, human asset specificity, dedicated assets, brand name capital and temportal specificity.
4market prices are effectively blocked. A virtual economy pretends to create value, but
destroys it in reality. Prices do not reflect the signals of the market and restructuring has
not occurred. It is not certain that a virtual economy will eventually turn into a market
economy. The problems of the Russian economy are institutional. Unwanted
adaptations of the transition process have to be studied in their context. North and
Thomas’s (1973) focus on change in economic history shows that change is path-
dependent. There is certain path-dependency vested in institutions making transition
complicated to direct.
Abundant empirical data shows that the absence of trust is the main obstacle for
development towards a functioning market economy, as well as being an obstacle
toward the development of democracy and the rule of law.3 In studying the
development of enterprises, an institutional approach is therefore needed. When
focusing on organizations in transition, Williamson’s approach has a lot to offer, even if
transaction cost economizing may not seem to be the main objective of privatized large
enterprises in Russia. The reason is the peculiar environment in which firms function.
Therefore some basic assumptions of Coase’s and Williamson’s approach to firms such
as private property and functioning markets do not completely apply to the Russian
environment. However, Williamson’s behavioral and dimensional assumptions seem to
explain Russian institutional peculiarities. Process analysis is also of vital importance in
studying transition. Furthermore, Williamson’s idea of asset specificity helps to
understand the need for credible commitments in an environment where opportunism
has to be controlled privately under great uncertainty. Fundamental transformation from
opportunism to trust is needed, but it is not easy in the Russian environment.
Company law and courts also have their role to play in establishing trust in the legal
system and contributing to the objective of reaching a market economy. According to
Williamson’s theory on a firm as a nexus of contracts and a governance structure, the
role of the courts and the legal system on the whole is often exaggerated. It is due to the
mainstream legal centralist standpoint, which emphasizes the role of the centralist court
system above those, who operate in business. Of course, courts are always important as
the ultimate place to appeal. They have ex post means to partly cover the damage and
also establish rules that can be enforced ex post. “However, courts are not available to
enforce intrapersonal and intraorganizational agreements. Organizations can use lower-
powered internal incentives and control instruments. Bureaucratic costs, of course, rise
as a result” (Williamson, 1988). Analysis of alternative modes of organization always
requires an examination of context. In a transition economy the role of the courts
extends to establish and enforce legal rules for a developing market economy. Even if
the role of the courts is not powerful enough in this huge task as Williamson’s approach
suggests, company law has an important role to gradually enforce good corporate
principles to protect outsider shareholders against the company insiders and creditors
against fraudulent debtors. The legal centralist approach exaggerating the role of the
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 For example, Rose et al. (1999) and Kääriäinen and Furman (2000) found in surveys a low level of trust
in institutions. Russian and foreign businessmen complained of the low respect of the law, contradictory
legal rules and the high frequency of breaches of contract (IIASA survey on Russian forest sector referred
to in Carlsson et al. (2000); interviews with businessmen in Lapland by Ollila (1999); and in case studies
by Törnroos and Nieminen (1999)). In such an environment maintaining hierarchy is a more secure
governance method than making market contracts.
5courts should, however, be avoided. In the development towards a market economy, it
is still crucial to change the business life. It is here, where legal norms either function
or not and where the rules in use develop.
1.3 National and International Company Law
The long socialist period abolished company law completely from Soviet law.
Enterprises formed part of the state bureaucracy, the huge machine, which had
abolished the market completely by drawing them inside a hierarchy. This development
did not take place voluntarily to save transaction costs but through an authoritative
order of the ruling Communist Party. Contracting within this hierarchy was done
according to tight administrative rules in order to fulfill the state economic plan.
Enterprises were juristic persons, but in practice they were only units of the state
bureaucracy (Tolonen, 1976). They had only possession rights on the property with
which they operated.
During perestroika the tight control of enterprises was eased to give them more
economic decision power. Private entrepreneurship in small businesses became legal
after being criminal for half a century. There were no forms of companies in the Soviet
Union except cooperatives, which had previously been cooperatives only in name and
were in fact governed by the state (Mozolin, 1992). Soviet managers, who had run state
companies for their own benefit for a long time and had increased such activities along
with decreasing state control, soon found new possibilities for rent-seeking. Parasitic
cooperatives were founded alongside state enterprises. The state paid overheads, but the
profits were channeled to parasitic private enterprises, the owners of which were the
managers of the mother enterprise (Bim, 1995; Jones and Moskoff, 1991).
The first Russian decree by the government on joint stock companies was passed in
December 1990. The forms of enterprises were also regulated in the law on Enterprises
in December 1990. The law determined several forms of enterprises, such as state
enterprise, municipal enterprise, mixed enterprise (commandite), limited liability
company/closed joint stock company, and open joint stock company. Cooperatives
were not included in the list, which meant that they had to be transformed into other
types of companies, usually joint-stock companies. Privatization of state enterprises
was effectuated on the above-mentioned legal basis. State enterprises had to be
transformed to open joint stock companies and privatized according to a presidential
decree on corporatizing (No. 721 of 1992). The decree contained a model of a company
charter.
A new Civil Code was passed on 30 November 1994. It determined the forms of
companies in a new way differing from the earlier decree. A new Law on Joint Stock
Companies was passed on 26 December 1996, 18 months after the main wave of
privatization was over and after 75% of the state enterprises had been transformed into
open joint stock companies with mainly private ownership. In 1998, a new Law on
Limited Liability Companies was passed, which started a boom for limited liability
companies. A limited liability company is popular in smaller and middle-sized
companies, because its administration is regulated more flexibly than that of a joint
stock company.
6In drafting new company law Russian legislators have had a lot of models from
developed market economies. Western countries have demanded modern company law
legislation in Russia to make business in Russia more understandable for foreign
investors. In the Partnership and Cooperation Treaty (1997) between the EU and the
Russian Federation modern company law is one of the commitments, which Russia has
promised to conduct. Thus, the example of EU company law directives is shown in
current Russian legislation.
Company law even in the EU is still quite national by character. Each country has its
own types of firms with different regulations.4 On the other hand, there is also a
tendency to harmonize company law. EU directives aim at developing one type of
company, which can fulfill the requirements of community directives. Harmonization is
needed not only to integrate the European market but also because of the pressure of the
globalization of competition in international markets. Corporate governance in an
enterprise in market economies creates the decision-making process by balancing the
interests of owners, managers and employees.  In spite of different interests there is a
common final objective, which is the profitability of the enterprise. Corporate
governance has been arranged differently in Anglo Saxon legal systems than in
continental systems. The differences reflect the relative importance of different
stakeholders in the economy in which they operate.
In the Anglo Saxon system, there is a board of directors collectively responsible for the
shareholders. In practice there may be a two-tier system inside the company in such a
way that some of the directors are executive and others control. The shareholders’
meeting chooses the directors, and usually the well-developed stock markets and
skillful investors, who know the markets, can control and direct the decision-making of
the company management. In the German system there is a two-tier system of
management with an executive board and a board consisting of representatives of
interest groups, which are important for the company. Banks are the most important
stakeholders, which appoint their representatives into the supervisory board.
Employees are also regarded as an important stakeholder group in Germany.
Employees’ representation in the management and control of big companies is also
guaranteed. The German Mitbestimmung system has raised a lot of resistance in the
United Kingdom, where it is not understood at all. The EU directive proposal for the
administration of companies, which also contains workers’ representation, is therefore
frozen at the moment.
Even if company law is national by character, Russia has chosen to follow European
models. However, there are still great differences due to differing business cultures.
Company law is so new in Russia that most of the Russian lawyers do not include
company law in the Russian system at all. Company law is regarded as part of the civil
law concerning regulation of juristic persons.5 Corporate governance is not an
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 According to Werlauff (1993) the differences in European company law are emphasized too much.
Therefore he wrote a book focusing on the common nominators of European company law. In this way,
he can actually show that company laws in European countries have a lot more in common than there are
differences.
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 This differing approach occurs frequently in the Tacis/Tempus project, in which the author participates
as a coordinator (Teaching comparative law JEP 10465-98: a consortium with Pomor State University,
7important issue yet, since managers keep shareholders in their control. It is not a
difficult task, since managers themselves are usually majority shareholders. Thus the
principle of equality of shareholders is not clear. There are also cultural differences.
Russian managers are authoritarian and used to keeping the enterprise under their
control without delegating power. Transforming formal regulations of company law to
meet international standards is thus a much easier task than transforming authoritarian
management culture and the economic environment.
1.4 The Aim and Structure of the Study
This study focuses on Russian enterprises in transition. The approach to transition is on
the enterprise level. The aimed objective of transition is to have capitalist firms in a
market economy. There are, however, great institutional obstacles in reaching this
objective. Special focus is on company law in its context. Does company law facilitate
the change for enterprises or is it one of the obstacles? Or does it have any effect at all?
In studying corporate governance behavioral aspects, the process nature and other
institutional explanations are taken into consideration. The focus is on what the ratio is
and what the aims are of a Russian firm and how they are changing. What is the role of
law in this process and does company law reflect the aims of a Russian firm?
The author of this report shares the idea that efficient markets are built from below with
assistance from the political structure but that the central figures in this development
are the managers of individual firms (cf. Carlsson et al., 1999). In establishing the rule
of law, courts are important, but the legal centralist emphasis on courts must be
rejected. In establishing the rule of law, civil society and informal institutions are at
least as important as the formal hierarchy of norms.
First, we focus on the general development of company law in the Russian legal
system. Company law is a totally new regulation, which has been drafted according to
modern Western models. On the other hand, Russian “company law” also includes
remnants from the socialist past. From the legal positivist point of view company law
has to be integrated into the legal system and from the legal realist point of view
company law should also be able to function sufficiently on the enterprise level. In the
first part we focus on the formal legal framework presenting the forms of companies
and how they are founded and registered. The gap between formal legal rules and the
rules in use is already met with the registration of companies.
                                                                                                                                              
Arkhangelsk, Russia; University of Lapland, Rovaniemi, Finland; University of Umeå, Sweden;
University of Abertay/Dundee, Scotland). Every time, when Western specialists use the concept corporate
law or company law, the Russian specialists want to remind them that there is no such branch of law in
the Russian legal system, but that the question is about the doctrine of juristic persons. Because the word
company or the concept company law or corporate law is not used in Russia, Butler uses the word
“association” instead of a company in his translations of Russian company laws (Butler and Gashi-Butler,
2000:introduction).  Company law will, however, gradually become a new branch of law in Russia too.
Also in Germany and other continental legal systems, company law emerged from the law of obligations.
Because of rapid changes in the economic environment, Russian civil law doctrine should soon be able to
develop to a more modern stage.  The hindrance for doctrinal development is the deep rooted legal
positivism and conceptualism in Russian legal theory and dogmatics (see, Nysten-Haarala, 1998 for a
discussion about the continental roots of the Russian legal system).
8The main concern of company law is the corporate governance aspect: regulating the
responsibility of company management as well as the relations of different interest
groups inside the firm. The relationship between shareholders or minority shareholders
and owner managers is complicated and informal rules stemming from the socialist past
still have an important role to play. Corporate governance, which stems from a quite
different tradition and should start to change, is the second part of the study. The rules
for liability of losses and damages show how bad corporate governance is sanctioned
within company law.
Russian enterprises are starting to orient themselves towards capitalist objectives such
as maximizing profits. The third part of the study focuses on the transformation of
Russian enterprises through studying the change of their aims. Comparing this
transformation towards profitability with the stakeholder ideas in Western companies
shows the contradicting requirements Russian enterprises must face and how profound
the process of transformation actually is for them.
2 Forms of Companies (and Other Juristic Persons)
in Russia
2.1 Juristic Persons According to the Civil Code
Only partnerships or companies are called commercial enterprises in Russia. According
to the Civil Code, there are two types of partnerships: full partnership and limited
partnership (commandite); and three types of companies: joint stock company, limited
liability company, and company of additional liability. The division between
partnerships and companies stems from Germany. Partnerships are associations of
physical persons cooperating in business, while companies are combinations of capital
(Komm./CC 1996).
All natural persons, who run a business, have to register as private entrepreneurs in the
State Company register. These physical persons are allowed to run a business as private
entrepreneurs without being a juristic person. These registered physical persons can
also be partners in full or limited partnerships. Also a juristic person can be a partner in
partnerships (CC 66 § 4.1). State and municipal administrative bodies cannot be
partners in partnerships without a special stipulation in the law.
2.2 Partnerships in Russia
2.2.1 Full Partnership (polnoe tovorishchestvo)
Full partnership is defined in the Civil Code (§ 69). A full partnership is based on an
agreement between partners, who are responsible for the obligations of the partnership
with their whole property. The relations between the partners are based on confidence.
Each partner is responsible also for each other’s transactions and this liability cannot be
limited in a contract (CC 75 §). Each partner can represent the company. Power to
represent the company and take care of the management can be divided in a contract. A
9new partner is also liable with his property for such obligations of the company, which
have arisen already before his partnership. A partner, who has withdrawn from the
partnership, is legally obligated for two years after withdrawal.
A full partnership is created by a partnership agreement (constituent or founding
agreement). This founding agreement must contain the name of the partnership, the
place of its location and the managing procedure, the amount and structure of joint
capital, regulations for possible changes in the shares of the partners, regulations for
capital investments and the liability for violation of this duty. A partnership must be
registered and its legal capacity as a juristic person is attached to the moment of
registration (CC §§ 50 and 51).6
There is no minimum requirement for the amount of the capital of the partnership. In
this respect Russian regulation of partnerships follows the Anglo-Saxon model. In
continental law the requirement for minimum capital is regarded as a rule protecting
creditors. There is, however, no evidence that the absence of minimum capital
requirements would have increased deceitful business in Anglo-Saxon countries
(Memorandum…, 2000). Partners anyhow have full personal responsibility for the
debts of the company. The absence of the minimum capital requirement makes starting
a small business easier. Since it is still difficult to acquire credit from a bank in Russia
to start a business, requirements for minimum capital might be an obstacle for starting
small businesses.
Partners can agree upon sharing profit. If there is no agreement, profit or loss is divided
according to each one’s share in the founding capital (CC 74 §). The Civil Code also
stipulates that partners must have the right to withdraw from the partnership (CC 77 §).
There is a term of notice of six months, which has to be followed unless there are
especially worthy reasons for a shorter period. A withdrawing partner is entitled to
compensation, which is defined according to the balance of the partnership (CC 78 §).
A partner can also be excluded from the partnership. Other partners can demand this
before the court, if they have a unanimous decision, which is based on a serious reason
such as gross violation of duties or incapability of reasonable management (CC 76 §).
2.2.2 Limited (Commandite) Partnership (tovorishchestvo na vere)
The Russian Civil Code also recognizes a limited partnership (§ 82) according to the
example of German Kommanditgesellschaft. In a limited partnership there are one or
several silent partners (commanditaire) along with general partners, whose liability is
similar to that in a full partnership. Silent partners are mainly investors, having a right
to profit and a right to get information about the financial situation of the partnership. A
silent partner bears the risk of losses within the amount of his investment. He has the
right to withdraw and the right to transfer his share of the partnership to another silent
partner. A silent partner can also be a juristic person and does not sign the founding
agreement. He can for instance make a deposit agreement with the general partners.
The anonymity of a silent partner is complete in Russian law.
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Compared to western partnership regulations, a silent member has as few rights as
possible in Russia. In some countries a silent partner may have the right of inspect as
well as the right of action for disputing the accounts. Furthermore, there are issues
contravening the partnership agreement or ordinary course of business that have to be
decided with the consent of the silent partners. In Russia, however, the silent partner is
clearly only an investor dependent on a partnership agreement, which he has not even
signed himself. He only has the right to withdraw from the company.
2.3 Companies in Russia
2.3.1 Limited Liability Company
(obshchestvo s ogranichennoj otvetstvennost’yu)
A limited liability company is one of the forms of company regulated in the Civil Code.
A new federal law on limited liability companies entered into force on 1 March 1998.
The new law contains detailed regulation, but it also stipulates that the Civil Code is
applied to limited liability companies as well. The new law was drafted on the basis of
the Civil Code regulations. After the new law came into force with more detailed
regulation, a limited liability company became very popular in Russia. It seems to be a
suitable form of company for small and medium sized businesses, which is actually the
purpose for which a limited liability company was originally created.
Members of a limited liability company are not personally liable for the commitments
of the company, but bear the risk of losses within the costs of the contributions they
have made. Typical for a limited liability company is the share capital. Law determines
a certain minimum capital for the company, which is a hundred times the minimum
wage according to the law on minimum wage,7 which is in force when the company is
registered (14 §). The investment of a member in share capital can be other items than
money, e.g., securities, property and other rights, which can be evaluated in money.
The founding capital is divided into shares, which have been decided in the founding
documents. These shares are determined in precise sums. The founding agreement must
include the names of the founders, the size of the founding capital, the share of each of
the members and the timetable within which the capital must be paid (12 §). The
agreement must also contain provisions in case the members do not pay their shares on
time, the rules according to which the profit is shared as well as the governing bodies.
The charter of the company may have more detailed regulations of, e.g., the rights and
obligations of the members, transfer of the share or rights of the shareholders meeting.
The minimum capital requirement was adopted to emphasize the nature of a limited
	
	
 	
		
	
a minimum requirement of DEM 50,000 (GmbHG 5 §). In England, where the private
company (PrC) corresponds to a Russian limited liability company, there are no
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 The minimum salary, which is used as an accounting unit is 83.49 rubles per month. According to a new
law on Minimum Salary, which was passed in June 2000, the amount was raised to 132 rubles in 2001,
but it only affects the minimum salary, which employers have to pay. As a calculation unit, the amount
stayed at the former level.
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minimum capital requirements. The minimum capital requirements have been criticized
for hindering the free choice of the company form for small and medium sized
businesses. In Russia, the minimum capital requirement is, however, quite small to
fulfill the purpose of protecting company creditors. Especially for a foreign investor the
minimum requirement is low. Therefore, Russian company law specialists have
suggested that the minimum capital for a limited liability company, with foreign
ownership should be 1000 times the minimum salary (Suhanov, 1998; Kommentarii…,
1998). This opinion is based on a Presidential Decree from 1994 on Registering State
Subjects of Enterpreneurship (No. 1482). This decree is, however, usually not applied.
If it were applied, it should also apply to joint stock companies with foreign
shareholders. Special requirements for foreigners are also against the spirit of the new
Foreign Investment law of 1999, which aims at non-discrimination of foreign investors.
Implementation and application of company law, however, vary in different regions and
state bodies. There is also a widespread habit in Russian society of charging foreigners
more than its own citizens. Therefore, companies with foreign ownership may face
special requirements in founding a company.
There may also be an obligation for additional investment in the company, but this
obligation has to be stipulated in the charter and decided at the members’ meeting. This
regulation resembles the English guarantee system. The members give a guarantee to
pay more in certain circumstances. In an English private company the additional share
is only connected to the liquidation of the company (Davies and Prentice, 1997). In
Russia it is not limited to liquidation, but can materialize at any time.
The law on limited liability companies also sets limits for the number of members in
the company. There has to be at least one member but not more than fifty members.
The law thus allows one-man companies but only in the event that the member is not
another one-man company. Allowing a one-man company has also been a gradual
tendency in European company law. Germany allowed a one-man limited company in
1981 and England a one-man private company after the EC 12th Company Law
Directive (89/667). Limiting the maximum number of members to 50 has been
explained by the fact that too many members could make governing the company too
difficult and cause conflicts (Kapkov, 1998:6). In Germany there are, however, no
limits on the number of members, and there are also GmbH companies with a wide
range of members (Lutter, 1998). In Russia limited liability companies are meant for
small businesses. Big privatized enterprises were not even allowed to choose to have a
limited liability company as their new form. They were all corporatized into joint stock
companies and cannot change the form of the company as long as the state has
unprivatized shares in the company (see Nysten-Haarala, 2001).
If the charter does not forbid it, new members can be accepted to a limited liability
company. The charter can also close the company to newcomers by stipulating that
members do not have to accept newcomers (Kommentarii…, 1998).  The closed nature
and flexibility have made limited liability companies popular in Russia. They are good
for small business and also quite practical for a big privatized joint stock company to
start and channel profitable activities. A limited liability company is regarded as a
daughter company, when another company governs 20% of the share capital (CC 106
§). In practice, the share of the company may be smaller and the share of its managers
as private founders much more. In the charter the company can be closed to outsiders,
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which is not possible in open joint stock companies. Transferring more profitable
activities to limited liability companies may be a possibility for former nomenklatura
managers to continue business, if they have to abandon the non-profitable privatized
joint-stock company, and eliminate outsiders from the more profitable business.
Limited liability companies are also preferred in foreign direct investments.  The
company may then be kept in foreign or shared ownership with carefully chosen
reliable and Russian partners.
2.3.2 Company with Additional Liability
(obshchestvo s dopolnitel’noi otvetstvennost’yu)
The Civil Code also recognizes a company with additional liability (CC 95 §). It is a
limited liability company but the liability is larger. The members have subsidiary
liability for the debts of the company with their own property in the amount, which is
for all of them equally multiplied to the cost of their contributions according to the
charter. There is no special law on additional liability companies, but the law on limited
liability companies mentions it (§ 56). Additional liability is also possible to arrange to
an agreed amount and in agreed circumstances. The rules on the limited liability
company shall otherwise be applied toward the additional liability company (CC 95
art.). Companies of additional liability are not as popular as limited liability companies.
2.3.3 Joint-Stock Company (aktsionernoe obshchestvo)
Joint stock companies are regulated in the Civil Code (96-104 §§). The code stipulates
that joint stock companies are also regulated in a Law on Joint Stock Companies,
however, without regulating the relationship between the code and the law. The Law on
Joint Stock Companies came into force in 1996. It regulates the foundation of the
company, the legal position of companies and the legal rights and duties of
shareholders. The law also contains rules on protecting shareholders’ rights and
benefits. The relationship between the code and special laws seems to be disputed
among Russian scholars. Some regard the Civil Code as higher legislation in the
hierarchy of norms and therefore prior to special laws. Braginskii (1998),8 who sees
that the Civil Code has priority before the Law on Joint Stock Companies, represents
this approach. However, if the Civil Code were regarded as a general law and the Law
on Joint Stock Companies as a special law, the latter would have priority according to
the lex specialis derogat legi generali-rule. The Law on Joint Stock Companies has also
come into force later and would according to the rule lex posterior derogat legi
anteriori also override the Civil Code.9
This dispute is not just theoretical as there are contradictory regulations in the code and
the law. One example is the rules on increasing the charter capital. According to the
Civil Code increasing the charter capital is an issue, which is decided upon at the
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 Braginskii is one of the main drafters of the Civil Code.
9
 The hierarchial position of the codes and its consequences is a disputed issue among Russian civil
lawyers. In a seminar in Vaasa 1997 preparing a book (Tolonen and Topornin, 2000), the leading
specialists of Russian civil law from the Institute of State and Law of RAS, Moscow, had a heated dispute
on the issue with contradicting opinions.
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shareholders’ meeting. The joint stock company law, however, regulates that deciding
on increasing the charter capital can be transferred to the directors’ board with a
stipulation in the company charter. Another example is that buying one’s own shares is
not allowed in the Civil Code, but has been made possible in the Joint Stock Company
Law.  The nature of the supervisory board also changed in the Joint Stock Company
Law because of taking into account the lobbying of the industrialist (Golubov,
1998:173).
According to Pistor (1997), letting the stipulations of the Civil Code concerning
companies stay in force was a mistake and caused a lot of contradictions in company
law.  The situation is due to rapidly changing attitudes in a transforming society.  The
drafters of the Joint Stock Company Law focused more on companies than the drafters
of the Civil Code. The Civil Code, however, contains the general doctrine of juristic
persons, which is considered to be the starting point of further regulation. The
coherence between the code and the new laws governing different forms of companies
should, however, have been dealt with.10 The legislator should have corrected the
regulations of the Civil Code to correspond with the new Joint Stock Company Law.
The new Joint Stock Company Law took Russian company law closer to the European
countries’ legislation. Already in the Civil Code (§97) Russian legislators paid attention
to European company law directives. Joint stock companies were divided into open and
closed companies, which corresponds to the division of public and private companies in
the European Union. An open (public) company can offer its shares in the stock
markets and is therefore subject to stricter rules for informing shareholders and the
public. A closed (private) company does not function in stock markets. Other
shareholders are entitled to purchase the shares, which a shareholder is going to sell
outside the company. There is no limit for the number of shareholders in an open
company, while in a closed company there cannot be more than 50 shareholders. One-
man companies are also allowed but, in the same way as in limited liability companies,
the only shareholder cannot be a juristic person. The minimum number of shares is two
but there is no limit for the nominal price of the share. The amount of charter capital in
a closed company is at least 100 times the minimum wage, while in open companies it
is 1000 times the minimum wage. Half of the capital has to be paid before registration
and the rest within a year afterwards.11 As in limited liability companies the share of
capital can also be other items than money.
Apart from law, the activities of joint stock companies are regulated in the company
charter. The charter is the founding document of the company and is accepted in the
founding meeting. A founding agreement can also exist, which is applied only to the
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 In his article concerning the contradictions between the Civil Code and the Joint Stock Company Law
Golubov (1998), who was one of the drafters of the latter, explains that the drafters’ starting point was to
make the law and the code consistent, but that it was sometimes impossible.  Golubov tries to explain the
differences and underestimate their impact.  Several times, however, he mentions that the Civil Code was
not always clear.
11
 The rule concerning paying the charter capital has been tightened in European Union countries where,
according to a company law directive, it has to be paid completely before registration of the company.  In
this respect Russia did not follow the EU company law directives but chose the older European rule.
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relations between the founders.12 The charter regulates the legal relation of the
company to its shareholders and third persons. The registered charter binds the
company, and all the changes to it become binding towards third parties as soon as they
have been registered (14 §). The law on joint stock companies only knows
simultaneous subscription. Successive subscription is not possible at all.
According to the law (11 §) everybody has a right to get acquainted with the charter. In
practice this requirement is not always fulfilled. Companies themselves do not want to
give information about the ownership and relations within the company, and the
registrar authorities have not always understood everybody’s right to acquire
knowledge about the charter (Clarke and Kabalina, 1995).  Transparency, which is an
important principle of European company law directives, is not included in the virtues
of Russian companies.  The reason is that in Europe transparency is needed to attract
investors, while in Russian companies portfolio investors are usually not needed and
even information about company management is regarded as a trade secret, which
competitors might use against the company.
The law lists all the information, which the charter must include. This list, though, is
not complete. Other requirements, which are not contradictory to law, can be included.
The charter must include the general information about the company. It has to regulate
the legal position of shareholders and the company bodies. Then there are non-
mandatory rules in certain issues, such as the qualifications for a member of the
directors’ board. In drafting the charter the regulations of the law have to be followed
strictly, otherwise the company cannot be registered. This has led to repetition of the
rules of the Law on Joint Stock Companies. First, the text of the law concerning, for
example, the bodies of the company is repeated word by word followed by the special
company-wide regulations (Lehtinen, 1997). Charters have become standard documents
in practice. Before entering into force of the joint stock company law, company charters
had to fulfill the gaps in law and create the legal position of the company (Lehtinen,
1997).
2.4 State and Municipal Enterprises
(gosudarstvennye i munitsipal’nye unitarnye predpriyatsiya)
State and municipal unitary enterprises are also included among commercial enterprises
in Russia. However, they still have their own form of company, which is inherited from
socialism. They are independent juristic persons; regulated both in the Civil Code (§§
113–115) and in special legislation.13 A unitary enterprise is defined as a commercial
organization, which is not endowed with the right of ownership to the property that the
owner (state or municipality) allotted to it. The property is entrusted to the unitary
enterprise with either the so-called right of operative administration or economic
management. These constructions are inherited from the socialist economy. Economic
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 A regulation of the Supreme Courts on applying the Law on Joint Stock Companies, 2 April 1997, No.
4/8.
13
 Decree on Federal State Unitary Enterprises based on the Right of Economic Jurisdiction of 6
December 1999; Decree on the Transfer of Federal State Unitary Enterprises to the Ownership of
Subjects of the Russian Federation of 9 December 1999.
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management means restrictions in the rights concerning immovable property. In
operative management the restrictions concern all the property entrusted to the
enterprise. In economic management the owner is not liable for the obligations of the
unitary enterprise, while in operative administration the state is subsidiarily liable for
the debts of its enterprise (Komm./CC 1996:141–146).
Unitary enterprises are not a dying form of juristic persons even if privatization changes
state enterprises into open joint stock companies.  Nowadays, municipalities have
started to have a lot of economic activity and the form, which the law offers them for
this activity, is a unitary enterprise.
3 Registration of Companies
Registration of companies is mentioned in the Civil Code. Legal norms governing
registration can be found in a law stemming from the RFSFR and in the President’s
Decree on the Regulations of the State Registration of the Enterprises and Individual
Businessmen on the Territory of the Russian Federation of 1994. There are also rules
on registration in special laws governing the different forms of companies.
According to the Civil Code the state registration is dealt with by the administration
under the Ministry of Justice (CC 51 §). However, this procedure is not functioning, as
putting it into practice has failed. The Law on Enterprises regulates that registration is
dealt with by the executive bodies of the Soviet of the People’s deputies. Such bodies
no longer exist. In current practice registration occurs in the departments of local
administration. Therefore there are different procedures for registration in different
towns and municipalities.14
There are some exceptions from this procedure. The Ministry of Justice registers
religious and social associations, even if the procedure does not work with companies.
The Federal Ministry of Justice registers companies with foreign investment with the
exception of oil and gas companies. Banks are registered by the Central Bank of
Russia.15
The application to register a company may be turned down for some reasons. If the
company or members of the company have violated laws, the application may be turned
down. Applications have also been rejected for reasons such as inexperience of the
members or the existence of too many companies in the same branch. Antimonopoly
bodies can also reject the application because of a dominant position or restrictions of
competition. Antimonopoly regulations are, however, quite weak since positive social
consequences can overweigh a dominant position. Social consequences can be jobs or
new houses (see footnote 14). Actually, if antimonopoly regulations were strict,
Russian industry and commerce would be split into smaller entities, since a dominant
position is typical stemming from the socialist economy.
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 Lectures by Maria Kotova in the summer school of the Faculty of Law, Universtity of Lapland on 4
August 2000.
15
 ibid.
16
A registered company gets a stamp on the charter and a certificate proving that the
company is a juristic person and has a right to conclude contracts. There are still
unregistered companies, which do not have the right for legal actions. One way to find
out whether the company is a juristic person and has the capacity for legal actions is to
ask for the certificate. Nowadays, local executive bodies should also give information
to everybody asking for it.
4 Corporate Governance in Russian Companies
4.1 Introduction
The current Russian Law on Joint Stock Companies has been praised as a long step
towards company law of a market economy (Orlov, 1999). There is no doubt of this. As
a formal system of norms it does not differ much from the company law of any western
market economy. The law has clarified a lot of earlier unclear rules. However, the rules
on corporate governance have been criticized as giving too little protection to the
shareholders (Orlov, 1999; Pistor, 1997).
Corporate governance can be defined in different ways. The Advisory Group of the
OECD, which produced a recommendation for corporate governance principles in 1999
defines corporate governance to “comprehend that structure of relationships and
corresponding responsibilities among a core group consisting of shareholders, board
members and managers designed to best foster the competitive performance required to
achieve the corporation’s primary objective.”16 This definition is a traditional Anglo-
American view of the corporation, according to which the board members are solely
responsible to the shareholders (Dignam and Galanis, 1999).
Corporate governance is a completely new issue in Russian civil law and even if, in
practice, there have been a lot of infringements of shareholders’ rights, corporate
governance has not yet been raised up as an important issue of company law or actually
the doctrine on juristic persons (cf. page 6). In Western countries corporate governance
has been the main issue due to several governance failures and misconduct in the recent
past.17 The reason for paying only marginal attention to corporate governance in
Russian legal studies is due to the fact that legal scholars are not yet acquainted with
such problems. Even corporate lawyers seldom come across with corporate governance,
because the authoritarian management inherited from the communist period is still
taken for granted.18 Above all, shareholders’ rights, which are the core of Western,
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 The primary objective, according to the Advisory Group of the OECD (1999), is creating long-term
economic profit.
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 These failures have led to a lot of reports to provide standards of corporate governance. In the UK there
are the Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel Reports. The American Law Institute, the American Bar
Association and the Business Roundtable have all passed their reports for US companies. France has the
Vienot report, Australia the Borsch Report and so on.
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 According to empirical research by Hendley et al. (1997), conducted in 1996 in fifteen enterprises in
Moscow and Yekaterinburg analyzing questionnaires of sixty officials, even lawyers assumed the powers
of the general director being stronger than the Joint Stock Company Law regulates. They were actually
astonished to hear that the law regulates differently.
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especially Anglo-Saxon corporate law, did not even exist in the Soviet Union. Getting
rid of Soviet State control emphasized the interests of the managers and employees.
The managers saw privatization as freeing themselves from outside control.
Shareholders, who are not managers or employees, are regarded as intruders, who
should not invade “our company”.
The discussion on corporate governance has had several approaches in market
economies. In the United States, Berle and Means (1967) already noticed in the 1930s
that division of ownership and control had led to a class of professional managers, who
run the company for the benefit of the owners. The interests of managers and
shareholders are partly conflicting when the managers are interested in increasing their
salaries and other benefits, while the shareholders are interested in profit. Berle and
Means’s theory brought the concept of managerialism into organization studies and led
to managerial corporate doctrine. The managerialist approach puts corporate
management at the strategic center of the large firm. Because of their expertise and
organizing resources, managers have the power to determine the processes of
production and distribution to dominate hierarchical bureaucracies and represent the
company to third parties. The power of managers was accepted and even facilitated in
company law.
There were, however, also those who denied the legitimacy of management’s position
claiming that managers were not accountable enough to higher authority. Realizing the
conflict between shareholders and management has led to company law protecting
shareholders’ rights with detailed regulations. Rights of minority shareholders to
challenge management and demand information stem from this origin.19
New economic theory, however, put forward a completely new approach displacing the
management-centered concept of the firm. The nexus of contract approach, which
stemmed from Coase’s ideas, did not regard a firm as a hierarchy where managers
determine terms by fiat. They did not describe management as a hierarchical exercise
but as a continuous process of negotiation of successive contracts (Alchian and
Demsetz, 1972).
The contractual approach developed the agency theory. Agency costs have tried to be
reduced in firm contracts. Jensen and Meckling (1976) developed the basic thesis of
agency theory. According to them, managers act as agents to shareholder principals.
Managers sell securities publicly to outside shareholder principals. The purchasing
shareholders assume that the managers maximize their own welfare and will bid down
the price of the securities. Thus management bears the costs of its own misconduct and
has an incentive to discipline its own behavior. Management increases self-control and
thereby increases the selling price of the corporation’s securities by offering monitoring
devices. These devices include independent supervisory directors and accountants as
well as legal rules against self-dealing. Corporate governance was seen as a result of
contracting and bargaining.
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 According to Bratton (1989) anti-managerialists dominated law reviews in the United States in the
1970s. However, company law remained substantially pro-managerialist into the 1980s.
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These new theories have led to demands for more flexible legal rules and allowing
more to be decided with agreements between management and shareholders. The
earlier approach, which in Germany and Scandinavian countries led to protective rules
after some scandals and grave misuses, has experienced criticism and recommendations
to replace formal binding rules with a more market-oriented approach.20 When the
stock markets have developed and widened, a new group of skillful shareholders has
emerged, who invest in companies that are well run and give profit. They can affect the
decisions of the managers by leaving the company and finding better firms for their
investments. Therefore it can be claimed that in countries with a sufficiently developed
stock market, it is the market that controls the power of the managers. The OECD
Corporate Governance Principles rest on these market oriented ideas of the Anglo-
Saxon model.
On the other hand, it can also be claimed that the stock markets are not well developed
except in some countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom. There are
also opinions according to which the recent crisis in the financial markets caused by the
Asian, Russian and Brazilian crises, casts doubt on the ability of the market to provide
adequate and efficient prudential mechanisms (Dignam and Galanis, 1999). In
continental European countries such as Germany it is often the interest groups, mainly
banks, which control the management of companies. In the Anglo-American system the
banks’ rights to own shares or officially participate in corporate administration is
restricted (Pistor, 1997). Stiglitz (1993) claims that banks are better controllers than
shareholders. While shareholders’ control is nominal, banks have managerial
knowledge and can control with their credits. The most common criticism of the control
of the banks is that the banks might act more for their own interests as lenders than in
the shareholders’ interest of profiting. There are both market control and network
control countries. The interest group control is usually concentrated in the supervisory
board controlling the managers (Nooteboom, 1999).21
In the dispute between the market control (exit) system and the network (voice) system,
both sides have defended their approaches with cultural differences. Corporate law has
developed within centuries and in different legal and corporate cultures. Quoting
Tolonen (1974) it has been a long learning process. Russia has its own cultural features,
which affect its formal rules and especially company culture. The Russian disrupted
“learning process” has been quite different from the continuous western one.
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 A recent example is a Memorandum of the Ministry of Justice on Reforming the Joint Stock
Companies Act in Finland (Memorandum…, 2000), which explains that there is a tendency to market
regulated company law.
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 The third form of corporate control is the Japanese keiretsu system, which also is a network of banks
and holding companies. Banks do not, however, play as important a role as in the German system.  A
keiretsu is a wide network of stakeholders such as business partners, government and local authorities.
Employees are also regarded as an important stakeholder group.  After the Asian economic crisis, Anglo-
Saxon features have been adopted into Japanese company law.
19
4.2 Relations of Different Bodies of a Company in
Russian Company Law
4.2.1 Bodies of Russian Joint-Stock Companies
The highest governing body of the company is the shareholders’ meeting. Once a year
there must be a general meeting of shareholders. There can also be additional meetings.
The law on joint stock companies (48 §) lists the issues which belong to the exclusive
power of the shareholders’ meeting and which cannot be delegated to other bodies. In
principle decisions are made with a simple majority. There are issues, however, which
according to the law require a qualified majority of 3/4 of the votes. Such issues are,
e.g., changes and amendments to the company charter, reorganization of the company
and liquidation of the company (49 §).
Shareholders, who own at least two percent of the voting shares, can deliver two
propositions to the general meeting agenda. An extraordinary meeting can be called
according to a board of directors’ decision on of its own initiative, or on the initiative of
the audit commission. An auditor, external auditor or shareholders, who own at least
ten percent of the voting shares can also initiate an extraordinary meeting (55 §). The
shareholders’ meeting is competent to make decisions, when more than half of the
voting shares are represented (58 §).
External voting is possible, except in decisions on the most important issues of the
general meeting such as the election of the executive bodies, audit commission and
consideration of the annual report (§ 50). In a company with more than 100
shareholders, voting at the general meeting with regard to agenda matters is carried out
only by voting ballots (60 §). In a joint stock company with at least fifty shareholders, a
board of directors must also be established (64 §).
The board of directors is a supervisory board responsible for the general management
of the company except decision-making in issues, which are given to the exclusive
power of the shareholders’ meeting. If the number of shareholders who own issued
shares with voting rights is less than 50, it can be stipulated in the company charter that
the shareholders’ meeting deals with the functions of the board of directors (64§). The
shareholders’ meeting chooses the members of the board of directors for one year. The
law lists the issues, which belong to the exclusive decision power of the board of
directors and cannot be transferred to the decision power of the executive body (65§).
The board of directors is a mixture of the British and German system.  The tasks of the
board of directors resemble those of the executive board of directors in the
Scandinavian and German joint stock companies. The difference is that the executive
board of directors is an obligatory body in those systems, while in Russia it is
obligatory only in companies with more than 50 shareholders (open companies).
Scandinavian and German systems have also another administrative board as a
supervisory body, which can be established in public joint stock companies. In Russia
there is no such two-tier system, which draws outside directors or governors of
different outside interest groups into the management of the company. The Russian
board of directors has the functions of both the executive and the supervisory boards of
the Scandinavian and German systems. In this respect it resembles the British board of
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directors. Directors of the executive body cannot form the majority of the board of
directors. If the general director is the only executive, he cannot be the chairman of the
supervisory board.
The functions of the board of directors are a bit unclear in Russian company law.  The
main reason for obscurities is that the Civil Code regulated the board of directors as a
supervisory board in a more German style.  The lobby group of Russian industrialists,
however, wanted to make the board of directors a governing body resembling more the
Anglo-Saxon system.  The drafters of the Joint Stock Company Law took their opinions
into consideration and made the board of directors a mixture of a supervisory and
executive body (Golubov, 1998:173). The law, however, stipulates that it is a
supervisory and governing body not an executive body (ibid, 171).
The executive body of the company is either one person as a general director or the
executive board (or some other collective body mentioned in the charter). If the charter
stipulates that there should be both a general director and an executive board, the
authorities of both of them have to be regulated in the charter.22 The general director is
the chairman of the executive board of directors. The executive body takes care of the
regular business of the company including ordinary legal actions and nomination of
personnel. Founding or liquidating executive bodies belongs to the authority of the
shareholders, if the charter does not stipulate this to the powers of the supervisory board
of directors (69 §). Large transactions, meaning purchasing or selling property in the
value of more than 25% of the balance value of the company’s property, belongs either
to the powers of the board of directors or the shareholders’ meeting (§§ 78–79).23
The shareholders’ meeting chooses the audit commission or the auditor. Auditing
takes place yearly. The audit commission or auditor himself can initiate additional
auditing. Also the shareholders’ meeting or the board of directors can decide on extra
auditing. A shareholder or shareholders possessing together at least 10% of the voting
shares can demand for extra auditing. Auditors must be outsiders and cannot be
members of any of the company’s bodies.
4.2.2 Comparative and Practical Aspects
In principle, the regulation of the Russian Law on Joint Stock Companies fulfills the
minimum requirements of the OECD principles. However, the board of directors has
more power than the shareholders’ meeting compared to European company law
regulations. Even if the Civil Code denies delegating issues placed within the exclusive
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 However, according to Golubov (1998:174), the drafters of the Joint Stock Company Law saw that a
collective board alone cannot be the executive body.  It can only exist with the general director.  This is
again a contradiction to the Civil Code article 103, which allows three versions of executive management:
an individual, collective, or both.  The reasoning given by Golubov is that a collective body cannot be
responsible for the executive tasks because it would make decision-making too complicated.  Here, the
opinion of the Russian drafters corresponds to the ideas of American corporate governanace with a lot of
power concentrated in the hands of the managing director.  In Scandinavian company law it is the
executive board, which is obligatory in all joint stock companies, while a managing director is obligatory
only in big open joint stock companies.
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 According to the empirical study of Hendley et al. (1997) in Moscow and Yekaterinburg, most lawyers
did not even know that a general director cannot make a decision on large transactions alone.
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authority of the general meeting to the executive bodies (103 §), the Law on Joint Stock
Companies does not stipulate questions concerning amendments to the charter in
connection with an increase of the charter capital to the exclusive authority of the
general meeting. Furthermore, the formation of the executive bodies are not within the
exclusive power of the general meeting. On the other hand, the general meeting does
not have the right to consider or adopt decisions with regard to matters not referred to
its authority. The shareholders’ meeting does not have any authority to intervene into
the authority of the board of directors. Russian company law specialists consider that
the law strictly restricts the authority of the general meeting (Komm./ZAO, 1996;
Glushetskij, 1996). The administration of a joint stock company can be arranged in
such a way that the directors can choose each other and increase the charter capital
without consulting the shareholders’ meeting (Orlov, 1999).
The power of the directors is also strengthened with the stipulation of the law that a
decision of the general meeting with regard to, e.g., the reorganization of the company,
annual dividends and large-scale transactions as well as acquisition and redemption of
issued shares by the company require the proposal of the board of directors (42 § and
49§). Even if the shareholders owning no less than 2% of the voting shares are entitled
to submit not more than two proposals to the general meeting agenda, the board of
directors can refuse to take the issues to the agenda. In such cases the shareholders may
appeal to a court (53 §). Likewise, the directors can refuse to call an extra shareholders’
meeting on the proposal of shareholders owning at least 10% of the voting shares, in
which case such a decision may be appealed to a court (55 §). The role of the court is
different than in Western countries company law, since the board of directors has the
right to refuse. Turning to the court is not merely requesting a declaratory action, but
the opinion of the court. Rights of minority shareholders are therefore already, in
principle, weaker than in Western countries.
In practice, the rights of minority shareholders are even weaker because the corporate
culture in Russia is still highly management-centered.24 In the Soviet Union soviet
managerialism without shareholders existed. Managers were employees of the state.
They were not always professionals, since they were chosen according to their political
merits. It is the same directors, who now continue to control privatized companies.
Turning to the court is a new right and the right of the courts to “interfere” in the
management of the company is new to the directors, who already got used to dictatorial
power after the collapse of the ill-functioning monitoring system of the state-owner.
In Western countries the role of the courts is usually regarded as minimal in company
law. The courts are reluctant to interfere in the inner conflicts of companies (Pistor,
1997). In Russia the courts are the only bodies, which in principle could implant rules
of modern company law into Russian corporate culture, but their opportunities to affect
on corporate culture should not be exaggerated. It is very difficult for a court to also
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 A typical example of Russian corporate governance, reported in OECD proceedings (Brom, 1998), is
the case of Novolipets Metallurgical Kombinat. The managers of this privatized company refused to
allow a group of outside investors, together owning 40% of the shares of the company, appoint four of the
nine members of the board of directors to represent their interests.  Company management blocked the
procedure claiming that the outside investors were intruders and managed to obtain their shares paying
much less than they were worth.
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solve inner conflicts of companies in Russia. A court can give a final decision, but it
does not guarantee that management practices of the company will change. It is also
doubtful whether courts have such knowledge and ability to decide on inner conflicts of
business organizations.
The board of directors can also dominate the shareholders in an open joint stock
company with formal requirements. In the general meeting personal participation is not
provided and the board of directors has effective means to hinder the use of the right of
a shareholder to speak. They can effectively use the rules on the agenda.  The
opportunity of shareholders to effectively participate, which is one of their basic rights
according to OECD principles, can be circumvented. Russian managers are masters in
circumventing rules. In the Soviet Union they dominated workers’ collectives.
Managers made the decisions beforehand, which the working collectives were supposed
to do. Also the labor union was under the managers’ control, since there could not be
conflicts of interests between managers and workers in socialism. Nowadays, when
managers and workers own the majority of the shares together in most privatized
companies, managers continue to treat the shareholders’ meeting in a similar fashion to
how they used to treat the workers’ collective.25  This kind of management is possible
also because the labor union is weak in Russia. The labor union has always been
dependent on both the government and the managers of the enterprises.
Many important principles of company law are not codified in Russian legislation. For
instance, the principle of equality of shareholders is not directly codified. It is, of
course, a significant part of the OECD principles and a clear principle in every western
country as well. In the Russian legal system, codifying everything is important, because
of the narrow doctrine on the sources of law. Neither court decisions nor legal studies
are included in the sources of law (Alekseev, 1999).26 The role of legislation is
therefore extremely significant. Since there are still not always official preparatory
works and even if there were, they have no value in interpreting legislation. The
wording of the legal text becomes extremely important in interpretation. A principle,
which is not codified, does not exist for Russian lawyers.
In a similar way the clear rule of the free right to sell shares is not clear at all in Russia,
where the insiders try to keep companies in their control. Control over the shareholder
register has given companies an opportunity to raise transaction costs for share trading.
New shareholders are often required to pay for registration. Entry barriers are common.
Companies frequently require not only documentation of the transaction, which in turn
needs to be certified by a specially authorized firm with a notaries certified copy of the
licenses of this firm attached, but also a variety of other documents. The shareholder
may have to formally apply to open an account, powers of attorney by the seller or
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 Even the clear rule, one share–one vote proved to be difficult to follow. To make voting simple it often
turned into one man–one vote rule with voting by raising hands, which was the old fashion of the
production brigades (Pistor, 1997).
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 Such a doctrine on the sources of law also diminishes the role of the courts. If the courts are given a
task to transplant new company law legislation into practice, there should be more court cases and be
easily available. Court cases are almost never commented on in legal text books. Decisions of arbitration
courts are published with comments in a series of books, which are sold out quickly. The Supreme
Arbitration Court also has a webpage (http://www.arbitr.ru), and their cases can be found in other legal
databanks, too.
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buyer, which has to be certified by a notary in case they send an agent to perform
registration, as well as prove that taxes are paid on the transaction (Pistor, 1997:173).
Abundant formal requirements are inherited from socialism. People simply continue to
orient themselves according to these requirements without realizing that more simple
rules might bring more flexibility and efficiency (Hendley et al., 1997).
The legal rules protecting creditors are also weaker in Russian law than in Western
countries. Both the division of a company and the decrease of the charter capital could
be decided in the general meeting with only informing the creditors. It is also possible
that, in principle, the company itself decides that it has no creditors and distributes its
assets after the decision of liquidation directly. There is only the requirement that the
liquidation commission must publish the information beforehand. The creditors must be
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which look after their assets. Therefore it is important to create financial markets in
Russia (Stiglitz, 1993). Financial markets are being created in Russia, but unfortunately
in a very monopolistic way. In a very short time a small number of banks have
managed to build up their own empires with the help of holding companies. Since the
banks are weak in Russia and their power is based on holding companies controlled by
a few businessmen, who are called oligarchs, it has been suggested that Russian
corporate control is going to develop into a direction, which is similar to the Japanese
keiretsu system (Pistor, 1997).27
If creditors and shareholders did not exist earlier, employees did. They are therefore
important stakeholders and actually at the core of corporate governance. According to
socialist ideology, the workers in a way “owned” the enterprise where they worked
since it was state property in their possession. This was one of the moral claims, which
was used to support insider privatization (Bim, 1995). Employees, who used to think
that the managers were responsible for arranging social benefits for them and look after
their needs, were told that with the help of insider privatization they were able to keep
their jobs. Therefore employees are still very important stakeholders.
Even if workers are an important group of stakeholders, workers’ representation in the
administration of the company was not arranged in the German way, let alone in the
Yugoslav way.  There was a discussion on including workers’ participation according
to the Yugoslav example, but this option was finally rejected (Krüssmann, 1998:289).
In practice, however, those workers who own shares are represented in the
administration of the company but managers effectively control them.
There are also serious gaps of transparency in Russian corporate practice. A lot of
information, which is published in Western countries to ensure the potential investors
of the good financial situation of the company, is in Russia regarded as trade secrets.
Enterprises have refused to inform outsiders, who their shareholders are or to give
information to minority (outsider) shareholders about the financial situation of the
company. Such behavior casts a shadow on such companies, especially when it is
widely known that illegal black market production is quite widely spread. Managers,
who have gained a lot of autonomy, have every incentive to convert firms’ assets into
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 The banks, which have gained a significant position in the markets, have managed to do this with the
help of good connections to politicians (The Big Seven, 1998).
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their own because of limited future horizons (Stiglitz, 1993). Except for pure self-
seeking, there are several rational reasons why Russian managers have to make
informal profits and keep the company formally unprofitable. If they were to show
profits, they would have to pay taxes, which are regarded as arbitrary and confiscatory
in Russia. Double bookkeeping is common in order to avoid taxes.28 Another reason to
make informal profits is that criminal organizations might become interested in a
profitable company. Managers also fear takeovers, especially those from foreigners. A
company showing profit might start to interest investing shareholders, whose presence
in the company may turn out to be disturbing (Gaddy and Ickes, 1998). There are no
stock markets in Russia, which could control the managers.  A controlling network
control system does not exist either.
4.2.3 Bodies of Limited Liability Companies
The administration of a limited liability company is possible to arrange in a much
simpler form than that of a joint stock company. The supreme governing body is the
general meeting of the members. The charter may provide the foundation of the board
of directors. The executive body of the company can be either a board or one person.
Members of the executive body must be natural persons, but not necessarily members
of the company. Either an internal or external audit commission may be provided in the
charter. An audit commission is, however, obligatory only for companies with more
than 15 members (32 § and §§ 40–42).
Meetings of the members can be general or extraordinary. The latter can be initiated by
the decision of the executive body, the board of directors, audit commission, auditor or
members possessing at least 10% of the votes (35 §). The article does not mention
directly that also one member possessing at least 10% of the votes could initiate an
extraordinary meeting. The wording of the Joint Stock Company Law also allows the
initiative of one shareholder. Tihomirov (Kommentarii…, 1998) supports a narrow
interpretation of the Law on Limited Liability Companies according to its wording.
This issue is not clear.
The Law on Limited Liability Companies lists the issues, deciding which belongs to the
exclusive power of the meeting of the members. These issues are:
• general direction over the activity of the company,
• changes to the charter including changes in the amount of the charter capital as well
as the founding agreement,
• formation of the executive bodies and audit commission,
• approval of annual reports and bookkeeping balance sheets and the distribution of
the profits,
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 According to a survey conducted within the framework of the New Russian Barometer (Rose, 1998:16)
56% of the population are of the opinion that there is no need to pay taxes if you do not want to do so. If
caught, 27% think the problem could be solved by paying bribes. The reason for such opinions is not
simply low morals of the Russians. Such opinions reflect the arbitrary and contradictory tax legislation as
well as the totally unrealistic and punitive tax penalty regime. Furthermore, taxation did not play a
significant role in the Soviet system where the state allocated resources without being dependent on tax
revenues. Paying taxes is simply a new duty.
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• the decision on the reorganization and liquidation of the company,
• as well as other decisions provided by the law (32 §).
The issues, which are placed within the exclusive authority, cannot be delegated to the
executive body according to the Civil Code (91§). However, the decisions on the
formation of the executive bodies as well as large-scale transactions, interested party
transactions and organization of general meetings may be delegated by the charter to
the board of directors according to § 32 of the Law on Limited Liability Companies.29
Participation of a member in voting at the general meeting requires his registration. The
general meeting is not allowed to adopt decisions on issues, which were not included in
the agenda unless all the members of the company are present. Most decisions should
be adopted by the majority of votes of all company members. Amendments to the
charter and some other issues, however, require 2/3 majority of the members’ votes.
Decisions on amendments to the founding agreement as well as the reorganization and
liquidation of the company shall be made unanimously. Other decisions except the
approval of annual reports and the balance sheet can be adopted through external voting
(38 §).
In practice in small limited liability companies with a few members, the general
meeting decides on even routine business, which usually belongs to the executive body
(Kommentarii…, 1998). Members often accept a charter, which determines too many
issues to the authority of the general meeting. Then handling day-to-day business may
suffer. The idea of the general meeting is that it would decide on matters, which affect
the mutual benefit of all members (Kommentarii…, 1998).
The authority and decision-making of the executive bodies of the company is defined in
the law, but it may be detailed in the charter as well as in a contract between the
company and an external manager. Members of the board or the general director can be
others than members of the company, but they have to be natural persons. The general
meeting chooses the board if the charter requires a board to be formed. A member of
the company can appeal to a court, if he thinks that his rights or legal interests were
violated by a decision of an executive body (§§ 40–43).
Exceptional for a limited liability company is that the so-called large-scale transactions
can be delegated to the general director. This can be stipulated in the charter. In the
absence of such a stipulation, it is the general meeting of the members that decides
upon large-scale transactions. The charter may define such decisions also to the board
of directors (46 §). A limited liability company can be made much more manager
centered than a joint stock company.
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 This is one of the disputed contradictions between the Civil Code and the Law on Limited Liability
Companies. The same contradiction also exists between the Civil Code and the Joint Stock Company
Law.  Golubov (1998), however, explains that the Civil Code only prohibits delegating issues, which are
placed within the authority of the shareholders’ meeting to executive organs.  The board of directors is,
however, not an executive organ but a governing organ like the shareholders’ meeting.  On the other
hand, Golubov does not mention that the board of directors also has executive tasks, even if it is called a
governing body in the Joint Stock Company Law.
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A member of a limited liability company, who has not participated in the general
meeting or who has resisted the decision, has the right to bring an action before a court.
He then has to consider the decision to be illegal or against the regulations of the
charter. A shareholder of a joint stock company has a similar right. The time limit is
two months. The court can hold such a decision as void, provided that it is illegal or
against the rules of the charter and infringes upon the rights of the member or
shareholder as well. In practice, the courts require that the infringement should be
significant (Lehtinen, 1998).
The Law on Enterprises of 1990 defined a limited liability company and a closed joint
stock company as the same type of company. Until the Law on Joint Stock Companies
entered into force most companies with foreign ownership were limited liability
companies. Closed joint stock companies started to be used after the joint stock
company law regulated closed joint stock companies. A closed joint stock company
has, however, after the Limited Liability Company Law came into force, become less
popular because the joint stock company law includes a lot of general rules, which
concern all joint stock companies. For a small company these rules are too clumsy.
Limited liability company law allows the administration of the company to be arranged
quite flexibly. It also allows completely closed companies, where no outsiders have to
be accepted.
Limited liability companies are new companies having no long inheritance of socialist
corporate culture, as do the privatized joint stock companies. Flexibility is important for
small companies, but there may be difficulties in using flexible rules, since corporate
governance of a market economy type is new and there is no experience with it. The
Law on Limited Liability Comp0anies also allows a management-centered
administration, which encourages continuous use of old socialist management
traditions. Russian businessmen are only in the initial phase of the learning process,
which in western market economies has lasted for centuries (cf. Tolonen, 1974).
We share the opinion of the so-called Austrian economics according to which small
business is where Russian enterpreneurship can be found (e.g., Kregel et al., 1992). It is
enterpreneurship that can change Russia into a market economy not monopolistic
privatized enterprises. Small entrepreneurs are, however, not such a lobby group as the
managers of big companies. Enterpreneurship is not supported. Thus, attitudes are not
favorable towards enterpreneurship. With profits small businesses have the same
problem as big corporations. They cannot show profits so as to keep both tax authorities
and criminal organizations at a distance. Also small business has its tricks to make
informal profits.
4.3 Liability of Managers, Shareholders and Members for Losses
4.3.1 Liability of Shareholders and Members for Losses
Neither the Law on Limited Liability Companies nor the Law on Joint Stock
Companies contains a general rule on a member’s or shareholder’s liability for losses.
The rule of the Civil Code (53 §) on liability for damages touches only on the liability
of the representative of the company. It does not apply to a member or shareholder
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provided that he does not represent the company in legal actions. The Civil Code does
not require willful action for the basis of liability. Negligence is enough to constitute
liability. So, if a member or a shareholder represents the company and causes damage
to the company, he is liable to pay damages if the other shareholders so demand.
Compared to regulations of company law in other countries’, it is exceptional that
Russian law does not regulate the liability of a shareholder or a member. For example,
the German Limited Liability Companies Act contains a rule on the liability of a
member towards the company. A member is liable to pay damages, if he has caused the
damage with willful action or gross negligence (GmbHG 9a§). Usually other members
are not allowed to receive damages in such cases. The Finnish Joint Stock Companies
Act also extends the liability of a shareholder towards other shareholders. The liability
includes damages to the company, shareholders or third persons (Koski and af
Schulten, 1992:353).
In the absence of a rule in law, liability for damage that a shareholder has caused to the
company is regulated only in the charter. The Civil Code is completely silent on for
example, the liability for not paying the share to the company capital. The code
delegates the issue to the founding agreement of the company (89§). Likewise the Law
on Limited Liability Companies delegates regulating damages caused by not paying the
share to the founding documents of the company to the company charter, which may
include a regulation on such liability (12§).
The company charter of a limited liability company can extend the duties of a member
considerably. He may have a duty to represent the company or participate in the
administration. In such cases, his liability naturally falls under the 44 § of the Law on
Limited Liability Companies concerning a manager’s liability.
4.3.2 Managers’ Liability for Losses
The § 53.3 of the Civil Code contains a general rule on liability for losses. It stipulates
that the members of the governing bodies of companies must act in good faith and
reasonably. If they cause damage to the company, they are liable to pay damages, if not
otherwise regulated in legislation or contracts. According to this general rule their
liability is for negligence.
The Law on Limited Liability Companies contains a corresponding rule in § 44. The
general director, a member of the board of directors and members of executive bodies
have a personal liability. There is a narrow interpretation, according to which the list is
complete and does not extend to, for example, a founder, auditor or a member of the
audit commission. Both the regulations of the Civil Code and the one of the Law on
Joint Stock Companies (71.2§) are interpreted in a similarly narrow way.
Good faith and reasonable behavior is defined to mean that the managers of a company
have to take care of the business as carefully as if it were his own and take the
necessary precautions like an ordinary person in his position would take
(Kommentarii…, 1998). The same rule stipulates further that in determining the
grounds and extension of the liability, ordinary business practices and other relevant
considerations must be taken into account. The Law on Joint Stock Companies
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regulates liability in a similar way. Ordinary business practice means that a manager
shall look after the benefit of the company. He also has to make decisions carefully and
with good business practice. These interpretations are quite similar to those of western
company law. It is difficult to say whether there are differences in court practice. The
benefit of the company as well as good business practice can be understood differently
in Russia. Taking care of employment even at the cost of shareholders’ rights to profit
would probably be understood as good practice. The shareholders are not regarded as
the core of the company, because previously the same company was explained as
belonging to the workers, who possessed it as state property.
Both the Law on Limited Liability Companies (§ 44) and the Law on Joint Stock
Companies  (71 §) require that a manager can be held responsible for damage, when he
has caused it. The loss must be his fault and there has to be a causal relationship
between the damage and the activity, which the director is at fault. The rule of the Joint
Stock Company Law has been the model for the law of limited liability, while the
model for the regulation of the Joint Stock Company Law has been the German
regulations of directors’ liability in joint stock companies (AktG 93 § and 116 §,
Ivanov, 1998).
The regulation on directors’ liability has not been simple to apply. The general rule of
the Civil Code requires responsibility for losses, which are caused by negligence. The
law on joint stock companies, however, seems to assume intentional fault. The
regulation of the Limited Liability Companies act is interpreted in the same way. At
least in legal studies it has been suggested that a director is liable for damage, which he
has caused intentionally, for instance, omission of his obligation to arrange reliable
bookkeeping (Glushetskij, 1996). The regulation is thus interpreted differently than in
Germany, where liability to pay damages may already emerge through negligence
(GmbHG 43 §, Lutter et al., 1987; Kraft and Kreutz, 2000). It has been suggested that
the wording of the Joint Stock Company Law is unclear. The law mentions losses,
which are caused by activities of a director who is at fault. It has been suggested that
such wording, which emphasizes the fault, should be interpreted to concern situations,
where managers have violated their obligations regulated in the law or the charter
(Ivanov, 1998).
There is no limit for damages. The law assumes the principle of full compensation
regulated in the Civil Code. According to § 15 of the Civil Code both the physical
damage and the loss (lost benefit) have to be compensated. In practice, the amount of
the damages can be quite high (Suhanov, 1998:42). On the other hand, the circle of
those, who are entitled to receive damages, is narrow. Only the company can receive
damages, not other shareholders, members or outsiders. For instance, according to
Finnish company law shareholders or creditors can also receive damages.
If there are several directors liable for the losses, then there is joint liability. The
company can claim damages from any one of those, who are jointly liable or from all of
them. A manager who has paid more than his share of the damages, however, has the
right of recourse from the others, who are jointly liable (CC 325§). However, those
persons, who did not take part in the administration or voted against it shall not bear
liability (72.2§ ZAO). The right to bring the action for damages is held by the company
or its members in a limited liability company (44 §). In a joint stock company
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shareholders also have the right to bring the action for damages, but only provided that
he or they own more than 1% of the shares of the company (71.5§). Since good faith
and reasonable behavior is presumed in the Civil Code, it has been interpreted that it is
the plaintiff, who has to prove that the manager deliberately caused the loss (Margolin,
1995:32).30
4.4 Personal Liability for the Debts of the Company
The main principle in companies is that a shareholder is not liable for the debts of the
company, except with the value of his shares, and a member is liable only to the
amount of his share in the capital. This is a principle separating companies from
partnerships, where liability is unlimited. In limited liability companies this principle is
not absolute, since there may be rules for additional responsibility.
A shareholder’s or member’s liability for debts is possible in some situations. If a
member has not paid his share, the founders of the company are jointly liable to the
amount of the unpaid share.31 A member, who has invested property given as
subscription in kind, may be held liable, if the subscription in kind has been evaluated
too highly. Such liability is, however, limited to the real value of the subscription in
kind. The joint liability of the too highly evaluated subscription in kind is limited to the
next three years after registration of the company. Also an auditor or an outside expert
can be held liable for his overvaluation. Their liability is also limited to three years.
Such liability for overvaluation is also only subsidiary. The creditors have to collect a
claim first towards the company. Furthermore, a member or a shareholder in a
dominant position may be held personally liable for all the debts of the bankrupted
company.
Both the Law on Limited Liability Companies (3.3 §) and the Law on Joint Stock
Companies (3.3 §) include a regulation according to which a member, a shareholder or
another person, who has a right to give binding orders or who has the possibility to
direct its activities in some other ways, be held personally liable for its debts
subsidiarily, if the bankruptcy of the company is due to his activities. This rule is a
clear exception from the principle of limited liability. A member or a shareholder can
be held personally liable to creditors of the company for the debts of the company. The
liability of the member in a dominant position is identified to the liability of the
company.
A shareholder or a member owning 50% of the company has a dominant position.
There has to be a direct causal relationship between indebtedness and the activity of the
dominating owner (Komm./ZAO, 1996:35). The Law on Limited Liability Companies
is silent about how the causal relationship can be detected, but the Law on Joint Stock
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 According to general principles of western procedural law the burden of proof can be reversed only
with a special stipulation in the law. In the absence of such a stipulation, the plaintiff is obliged to prove
that the manager caused the loss deliberately. Margolin’s way to argue his point indicates that the rules
for using reversed burden of proof are not as clear in Russia as they should be in a rule of law country.
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 There is already a decision of the Supreme Arbitration Court, in which the court held the members of a
limited liability company jointly liable for the 6 million rubles, which one of the members had not paid
for his share (No. 5411/98).
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Companies has a rule in 7.3 §, which according to legal scholars can also be applied to
limited liability companies. A causal relationship exists, when a person has used his
dominating position in such a way that there has been a decision in the company, which
caused the bankruptcy. It is also required that the person in a dominating position has
acted knowing that his actions would cause bankruptcy (Komm./ZAO, 1996:35).
When a court sets a subsidiary liability on the debts of the company for a member or
shareholder, it also has to determine the amount of the personal liability (Komm./ZAO,
1996:45). Since personal liability is subsidiary, the debtor has to try to collect the
amount first from the company (399 § CC). The creditor can collect only the amount,
which the company has not been able to pay. According to the Law on Bankruptcy (2
§) the creditor can turn to the shareholder and demand payment after 3 months from the
maturity of the debt.
The Russian regulation on the identification of the liability of the company with the
liability of the dominating person most corresponds to the French rule in the
Bankruptcy Act. Identification presupposes that the creditors can prove that the
dominating member actually caused indebtedness with his negligence. In England the
Salomon v. A. Salomon Co. Ltd. case from 1897 still constitutes the principle of
separating the company from the owner. The decision admitted the right to separate the
company from personal property even in small companies with practically only one
active owner. In the Insolvency Act of 1986 it has been regulated that if it is found that
the company intended to defraud the debtors or the company was used in an otherwise
fraudulent way, then such a member can be held liable to add an amount, which the
court finds fair. It is also required that the member has actually participated in a
decision with a fraudulent aim. English courts have sometimes exceptionally held
members liable for the debts of the company, reasoning the decisions with fraudulent
trading (Davies and Prentice, 1997).32
German courts have also held that the liability of a member of a GmbH company for
the debts of the company can in some cases be personal and unlimited. However, a rule
does not exist in the GmbHG about the principles of personal liability instead of the
company. There is, however, the rule of the 32 a § in the GmbHG concerning indirect
identification. If the company has not had enough capital and a member has granted a
credit to the company when a bank would not have granted it the member may be held
liable to the debts of the company (Hueck, 1991:368). Identification is thus connected
with an extraordinary situation, when the principle of limited liability is violated. A
member can be held liable, when he mixes his own property with the property of the
company, or misuses the form of the company (Lutter, 1998; Hueck, 1991). The EU
has issued a directive to give an entrepreneur an opportunity to do business in a one-
man company within limited liability in all member countries (89/667 12th company
law directive). The directive does not, however, prevent the member countries to
regulate that in some extraordinary situations the liability of the company can be
identified with the personal liability of a member (Werlauff, 1993).
                                                
32
 In common law countries the doctrine for makjing people behind the company liable is called lifting the
corporate veil or piercing the coporate veil.
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Since the protection of creditors is much less effective in Russian than in English or
German company law, it may be grounded to hold a member liable for the debts of the
company in some situations in connection with bankruptcies. It will be seen in the
future whether Russian courts are going to follow the international rule on a wider
liability in some extraordinary situations. At least written law clearly allows it.
In a virtual economy, bankruptcies are not for anyone’s immediate need. Even
unprofitable companies are kept going, because the creditor would not win anything in
his positions where he is tied to a network, where everybody is indebted (Gaddy and
Ickes, 1998). There are, however, more and more bankruptcies occurring in Russia. In
the Russian extraordinary situation, it is obvious that bankruptcies are going to occur in
the long term. For the time being it is small new companies, which are more likely to
become bankrupt than the big privatized ones, which function within a network of a
virtual economy. In practice, this means that it is not the most unhealthy companies that
become bankrupt, but those who do not find their place in a virtual economy.
According to Bim (1995) the policy of managers refusing to restructure and operating
partly in the black market is going to drive companies to bankruptcy, which in the long
run can turn out to be good for the Russian economy. Bim (1995) assumes that bad
management will abolish non-profitable companies from the market. For the managers
themselves it may also be an opportunity to get rid of the unprofitable privatized
company, when they already have been able to secure their future in a profitable new
company, which has been created beside the unprofitable privatized company.
Even if the rules for personal liability of the managers exists, typical bad management
of a virtual economy, would obviously not be considered as a deliberate action causing
losses for the company. The courts might accept explanations, according to which the
intention was to prevent unemployment or to take care of some other social duty. The
widely spread habit to produce for the black market and share the profits among a small
circle of insiders, is clearly criminal and causes losses both for the company and the tax
collector. Such illegal activity seems to be regarded as a phenomenon connected with
transition and is therefore tolerated as long as it remains hidden. The development of
market structures and business culture should gradually correct the situation. Even so,
the flourishing black market business is, however, also an institutional problem
connected with widespread corruption, which is dangerous for the Russian economy
and the development of society. Such circumstances keep the level of trust in business
and politics low and hinders sustainable economic development.
5 Social Responsibilities of Russian Companies
and the Stakeholder Theory
Making profit for the shareholders is clearly the main principle of a company in the
company law of most market economy countries. This principle is often also explicitly
declared in the legislation. This principle can be understood to stem from the point of
view of protecting shareholders’ interest towards managers’ personal interests. Making
profit is also understood as the special feature distinguishing commercial organizations
from other economic organizations. It has, however, often been argued that
multinational companies and other foreign developers have a responsibility to improve
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the material conditions of the people in whose territory they operate. As a matter of
distributive justice it is thought that these companies should be sharing the acquired
wealth with these people through the creation of ‘collective goods’, infrastructure
development and compensation disbursements aimed at their benefit. This point of
view has been called a ‘stakeholder theory’, the main idea of which is that the company
should share the profits with affected ‘non-shareholder’ groups.
There have been tendencies in the developed world, especially in the United States
towards such legislative development, which aims at sharing profits with the
community (Lea, 1999). There are also codes of conduct for the multinationals.33 Many
multinationals, however, do not act according to the stakeholder theory. It seems that
without enforceable legal rules, multinationals who are often in a position where they
could make an affect on developing local business culture, still only tend to increase
corruption in corrupted countries. A good example is Shell, which takes care of its
public relations in developed countries, but actually finances Nigerian military
dictatorship and politics oppressing the local population.34 However, many see the
development towards legislation supporting stakeholders’ rights in the US as possible
advancements for indigenous peoples and aboriginal groups. On the other hand, it can
be shown that such duties result in the generation of excessive costs. Furthermore, such
tendencies seem to lead to unrealistic expectations from the part of the stakeholders
(Lea, 1999).
While the Western world discusses stakeholder theory, the post-communist world tries
to transform companies to make a profit. Profiting companies could pay more taxes,
which could be used for the benefit of the community. Soviet enterprises had a lot of
social duties and they actually worked in a network of stakeholders. Especially after
World War II the social duties of enterprises increased. They had to finance
kindergartens, schools, housing, transport, medical care, and give their products
(electricity and oil) freely to the local population. It was only a question of organizing
the duties of the state, since enterprises were state bodies. They did not pay ordinary
taxes but operated with different funds. There was often a town built around a big
enterprise, which did not function simply as the only employer of the inhabitants, but
also provided houses for the employees, maintained them and arranged all kinds of
social services, including sports or other entertaining clubs for the local people.
Drinking water supply or heating stations were often planned and constructed together
with the large enterprises and on their costs, benefiting not only the company but also
the surrounding community. Profit, on the other hand, was not important since
enterprises had to fulfill production plans. Financial profit was not required
(Commander and Jackman, 1995).
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 The most well-known codes of conduct are the OECD guidelines for multinational enterprises (OECD,
1986).
34
 There have been a lot of newspaper articles about Shell’s poor human rights and environmental record
in Nigeria, e.g., Adams (1995). The multinationals’ support to Suharto’s government violating human
rights in Indonesia is also a well known story, e.g., Robinson and Thoenes (1998). British Petroleum has
even been condemned by the European Parliament for funding death squads in Columbia. The ITT
instigated the CIA’s involvelment in the removal of Alliende and his replacement by General Pinochet in
Chile.
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It is this tradition, which still gives an enterprise an opportunity to pay its taxes with its
own products. A building company can build a school or a metro station, if it does not
have cash. A virtual economy functions with barter and cash reserves are rare. Formal
profits are not insignificant as in socialism; they are even a nuisance, which is tried to
be avoided.
Privatization of enterprises has changed the attitude towards social duties. Most of the
social services were to be transferred to municipalities and private companies were to
start functioning according to the rules of a market economy (Commander and
Jackman, 1995). The Presidential Decree of 10 January 1993 prohibited privatizing
social and cultural property together with the enterprises.  According to the
privatization program all these social and cultural “objects” and responsibilities had to
be transferred to municipal authorities within six months from the confirmation of the
privatization plan. Large enterprises are in a difficult situation where they, in principle,
should start to restructure and make profit for the shareholders. It is a good reason to
get rid of extra social costs. On the other hand, companies avoid taxpaying as much as
possible. However, avoiding taxes is more acceptable in Russia than cutting down
social benefits and causing unemployment to make the company profitable (see
footnote 28, cf. Rose’s opinion survey). Companies are at a crossroads, where they
cannot completely abandon the old “taxpaying system” with the social benefits of
socialism, but where they cannot start to show profit and pay ordinary taxes either.
Many social responsibilities of the enterprises were duties, which were based on
legislation. Housing, for example, is still a duty of the enterprises, which have
apartments on their account, according to the Federal Housing Code. Because
municipalities have not been able to take these duties on their own cost, companies
have been forced to continue providing them. Often enterprises have founded joint
companies with municipalities to take care of social responsibilities. The level of social
services is negatively affected, since municipalities have not had the financial resources
to take care of the infrastructure costs. Additional social duties are one factor, which
makes transition to a market economy complicated and hinders restructuring.
Enterprises, which try to get rid of their earlier social responsibilities have ethical
hindrances for restructuring, which would make most of the population of the
surrounding town unemployed and leave them without social benefits. Employees also
prefer to keep their jobs, even if they are badly paid, because losing the job would lead
to losing all of the other social benefits as well. Usually companies can still offer better
social benefits for both their employees and their families than the municipality.
The relationship to employees is different in Russia and still carries on socialist
inheritance. Both managers and workers are authoritarian. The latter expect the
managers to take care of them. Earlier they received a lot of social benefits, health care
and perhaps even holidays in the southern parts of the Soviet Union. Nowadays
workers put their trust on the managers to maintain their jobs. Such attitudes can
postpone restructuring, which in the end, however, is unavoidable.
Russian managers also differ from their Western counterparts. First of all, authoritarian
management was a rule and authoritarian managers were respected among the workers.
A manager delegating powers was regarded as a weak manager. Most directors are
engineers, because production was important, while marketing did not play any role
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whatsoever. Therefore, knowledge about the economy is low among Russian managers,
or actually economic skills, in the western meaning, are at a low level. Russian
managers, however, do well in a virtual economy, where social skills connected with
the network within which the enterprise works are of significant value. Those
attempting to change the rules, would definitely suffer. The loss of control during the
perestroika period gave directors more power, which they used for “self-seeking with a
guile” as Williamson (1985) puts it. Self-made entrepreneurs are treated as “dishonest
businessmen” in these established circles. With their monopoly position, big privatized
enterprises can affect on small business, too. They can support those, who agree to play
along with their rules and who have good personal connections with them.
In the Soviet Union, environmental protection was badly arranged. Even if companies
had to take care of the community, environmental questions were not paid any
attention. There was the attitude that natural resources are abundant in Russia.
Nowadays, the voices for environmental protection have grown. Citizens can openly
discuss the health and environmental disasters caused by pollution. Still, when jobs are
weighted against restructuring and environmentally better technology, jobs weigh more.
The media, however, has had an important role in making environmental catastrophes
public and affecting on the public opinion. There are also many international
environmental movements such as Greenpeace operating in Russia nowadays. Their
active role has sometimes had negative effects on public opinion. Super-power
mentality does not accept foreigners to come and advise and show obvious
disadvantages of Russian society. On the other hand, this mentality easily buys the idea
that foreigners have to finance environmental programs, which actually benefits them
thereby reducing the environmental danger towards them.
Environmental protection is not well arranged in Russia from the enterprises’ point of
view. There are several authorities with their own requirements. The distribution of
powers among governmental bodies is obscure.35 It seems that the anxiety of the
citizens has made the government increase control and found more and more new
bodies for environmental protection. Coordination between them has, however, been
forgotten. Environmental control also belongs to joint powers of the federation and its
subjects, which causes additional problems. Regulations on different levels may differ
considerably from each other.
There is a lot of bureaucratic environmental control, but it is not effective. Russian
enterprises do not take environmental control seriously. Even foreign companies, which
at home are required to take environmental protection into consideration, misuse
Russian corrupted and ineffective environmental control. Examples are Finnish forest
companies, which have harvested protected primeval forests in Karelia (see Piipponen,
1999). The case was made public by international environmental organizations.
Globalization has reached Russia in both good and bad respects.
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 There are examples of how complicated and contradictory rules affect on companies in the forest sector
in Maria Kotova’s forthcoming paper (Kotova, 2001).
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6. Summary
The role of the company is changing in Russia from an administrative unit of state
administration to a profit-making unit of a market economy. The administrative unit
and its governance by fiat correspond easily to the legal positivist idea of system of
norms and endogenic technical definition of concepts. According to such thinking,
changing technical rules will change the functioning of companies. However,
companies and their corporate governance do not change only by changing formal
rules. Experience from Russian companies in transition proves the weakness of legal
positivism and the strength of legal realism. Corporate governance can be quite
different in practice in different countries, even if the technical legal rules are almost
similar.
Western company law is a product of a long term learning process without significant
interruptions. There have been misuses, which have affected on improving the formal
regulation. There is a tendency from protecting shareholders and seeing them in the
core of the company to a wider interpretation. Both stakeholder theory and a firm as a
nexus of contracts saving transaction costs represent such a widening of the
perspective. Shareholders have to give room to other stakeholders in the core of the
company. A firm is regarded as a going concern, the aims of which should be
understood in the context.
The Russian business environment differs from that of western market economies and
therefore a firm is understood differently. Earlier there was a wider “stakeholder”
approach, which regarded an enterprise as the unit responsible for the well being of the
workers and the community at large. There is such a thing as Russian managerialism,
which sees managers in the core of the company. Managers of former state enterprises
privatized the enterprises for themselves in cooperation with employees. Since
managers together with employees control the majority of the shares in most privatized
companies, ownership and control are not divided in Russia. It reflects on a weak
protection of minority shareholders and creditors. Directors managed to lobby company
laws while they were drafted and further weakened the rights of minorities making the
use of their rights technically complicated. Flexible rules that are now demanded more
and more in Western countries would not work in the Russian environment without an
effective control system of the managers. Extremely formal rules can also be misused
as barriers protecting managers’ benefits. Russian managers have a long tradition for
such a policy. They seem to treat other shareholders in a similar way as they
manipulated workers’ collectives before. Agency theory explains the behavior of
Russian managers, who do not have to negotiate with their shareholders, yet. No one
monitors the monitors, because there are no markets to control them.
Russian firms function in a virtual economy, where networks and good connections
matter and exchange is to a great extent barter. Bizarre taxation rules make profits
costly and also encourage making informal profits as well as transferring capital
abroad. It seems that company law has very little to do with actual corporate
governance. With company law the legislator can transplant the formal system of norms
into Russian society. Courts, of course, have a new role to control and help to plant new
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business culture. Their role should, however, not be exaggerated. A lot depends on the
managers, who are in the core of Russian corporate governance. They have the power
to start to restructure, which would be in the shareholders’ long-term interests. Many
shareholders, however, are also employees who do not wish to lose their jobs. Also a
high burden of social responsibilities, which the companies have difficulties to get rid
of, hinder restructuring.
Even if western economic theory does not fit into Russian concepts, it can still give
new approaches to Russian company law. The logic of economic organization is
different in Russia. Profits are costly and transaction costs are saved often with illegal
methods. Restructuring has been postponed due to “an agreement” between managers
and their workers. The latter helped the former to keep the enterprises in their control in
order to maintain their jobs. Managers owe a lot to the workers and are therefore still
reluctant to increase unemployment. The agreement to keep things running as much in
the old way as possible maintains a virtual economy. It cannot, however, last forever.
Old style management will bankrupt the enterprises sooner or later. Managers still have
an opportunity to survive, if they have managed to channel most of the profitable
production to new companies. Old companies are actually more profitable than is
shown. Since formal profits are costly, production is channeled to the informal sector.
Managers can “suck the company dry” before they become bankrupt. Officially they do
not cheat the workers in this way but maintain their jobs as long as possible. Company
law has rules for sanctioning losses, which are deliberately caused to the company.
Running the company into bankruptcy can also be sanctioned. It is, however, obvious
that such rules can only be exceptionally used. Producing profits informally and double
bookkeeping fulfills the definition of deliberately running a company to bankruptcy. It
is, however, too common in Russia. In principle, exceptional personal liability of
managers for losses has an exceptionally fertile soil in Russia.
Virtual economy networks diminish uncertainty with experienced methods. Asset
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Managers’ self-seeking has no control.
Russian company law is a transplant, which does not meet with the current aims of
companies functioning within a virtual economy. The forms of companies resemble
German counterparts but also contain remnants from the socialist past. Transplanted
company law introduced new models for governance structures, but old administrative
methods prevailed on the side. Modern corporate law is structured for market control
and rests on the assumption that ownership and control are divided and that
shareholders have become moving investors. In Russia, shareholders are not the core of
the company. The core is the majority of the shareholder managers, who are able to
control the company effectively. The market does not govern them, because the
framework of a virtual economy does not force to restructure or even make a profit.
Shareholders are not investors. Insider shareholders only want to secure their position.
Because of insider privatization Russian companies are more closed than the law would
allow. Information is given reluctantly, since companies do not compete for
shareholders and good investors. However, there is a learning process going on. Some
managers may understand the need for restructuring. The change is vested in small
enterprises. Russian economy is, however, dominated by big privatized enterprises. The
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state should encourage entrepreneurship, but the managers of big privatized enterprises
are a significant lobby group, which can keep the economic policy favorable for them.
The unholy alliance of the government circles and the oligarchs keeps supporting
unhealthy monopolistic enterprises.
Privatized former state enterprises have not emerged through contractual relations with
private owners as economic theories explain firms, but have been created by state
authority and now continue their life in a new private property form because of the will
of the state. They are some kind of hybrids between administrative units of state
bureaucracy and capitalist firms. On the other hand, there are also “new” small and
medium sized enterprises, which have been started during the last ten years and which
have been private from the beginning.
On the one hand, the development has been path-dependent but on the other hand, it has
produced unwanted results. Modern company law is not perfect for a virtual economy,
where it can be misused, neglected and ignored. The development also proves that the
rationality of the legislator is bounded. No one can possess the required information
and knowledge about the changing environment of Russian business. Russian company
law regulation is not created to answer the immediate needs of current business, but for
the future. In this way the legislator attempts to speed up the learning process towards a
market economy. However, there always lies a danger in this kind of teaching of
businessmen. In the worst scenario, law loses its authority completely.
7 Recommendations
Even if company law of modern market economies does not completely fit into the
Russian environment it is, however, the only possible way to continue developing
company law.  For foreign investors it is easier when the regulations of company law
are international.
There are some weaknesses in Russian company law, which should not be difficult to
correct. For example, the requirements on companies to publish information should be
tightened to ensure transparency. The equality of shareholders should be protected more
efficiently by abolishing excessive formalities, which enable managers to make
shareholders silent. The liquidation of a company without informing creditors should be
made impossible.  The provisions of the Civil Code should be made consistent with the
later drafted Joint Stock Company Law and the Law on Limited Liability Companies.
An audit commission or an auditor should also be made obligatory in smaller limited
liability companies.  This would not make management more complicated but would
protect creditors’ interests.  Management of close limited liability companies should not
be made too flexible because it may encourage fraudulent business.
The development, which in European countries seems to go towards more flexible
company law rules, does not fit into the Russian environment that has no effective
control of managers. Flexible rules, which give managers more power, would only be
used to keep minority shareholders silent in the absence of effective market control,
which enables flexibility in more developed countries. On the other hand, there are
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formal rules that enable managers to silence minority shareholders, which should
therefore be abolished. The control of managers is important in the Russian business
environment.
Corporate governance should be studied and should be able to find its place as the most
important issue of company law.  Such development requires a change in legal thinking.
Company law developed out of the law of obligations and used to be part of the doctrine
of juristic persons also in Germany in the 19th Century.  The development towards
separate company law occurred with the development of a market economy.  The old
fashioned legal positivism and conceptualist standpoint hinders the development of
Russian law to reach the needs of a modern market economy.  The most effective way
in the long term is to educate legal scholars and university teachers.
Since it is the managers who are at the core of developing corporate culture, they should
also be educated.  This may be a difficult and complicated task because on the one hand
Russian managers have to adapt to the environment of a virtual economy.  On the other
hand, Russian managers should start to think in terms of a market economy. Only
investing in restructuring can save Russian companies in the long term.  Responsible
managers have realized this fact even if they have to work daily with problems, which
are due to a virtual economy.
The problems with the management of companies are tightly connected with the
attitudes of the managers.  They should be able to understand that the shareholders have
their rights, which cannot be neglected.  Transparency is also in the long term the best
policy for any company.  Russian enterprises need strategic investments and not typical
western portfolio investments.  However, western investors, who are ready for strategic
investments, might have experience in running companies and ideas for developing a
Russian company to an internationally competitive level.  Even if Russia is, in itself, a
huge market area, globalization is a fact that even Russian companies cannot escape. On
the other hand, it is understandable and acceptable that Russia wants to protect its own
industry against competition during the transition period. There should, however, be
better means available than hiding and distorting information with the help of company
law rules.
Even if corporate culture is not developed in the courts, they are important as a final
resort in solving disputes.  Judges, therefore, also need training and education.  Even if
there are specialized commercial courts (arbitration courts) in Russia, the general level
of knowledge of the changing business environment is not one of the strongest among
Russian judges.  The attitude that lawyers teach businessmen should be exterminated
completely.  Lawyers and businessmen should be able to work together and understand
the interests and objectives of one another.
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